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Abstract
As a global financial service provider, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) is supervised by banking
regulatory agencies in different countries. Bruno Iksil, the derivatives trader
primarily responsible for the $6 billion trading loss in 2012, was based in JPM’s
London office. This office was regulated both by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) of the United States (US) and by the Financial Services Authority
(FSA), which served as the sole regulator of all financial services in the United
Kingdom (UK). Banking regulators in the US and the UK have entered into agreements
with one another to define basic parameters for sharing information gathered during
bank examinations and even assisting one another with bank inspections under
certain circumstances. However, even as JPM sought to stifle OCC and FSA
supervision, cooperation between the US and UK regulators was minimal.

_____________________________________________________________________
This case study is one of nine produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS)
examining issues related to the JPMorgan Chase London Whale. The following are the other case
studies in this case series:
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale A: Risky Business
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale B: Derivatives Valuation
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, and Models
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale D: Risk-Management Practices
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale E: Supervisory Oversight
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading
• JPMorgan Chase London Whale Z: Background and Overview.
Cases are available at the Journal of Financial Crises.
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1. Introduction
On April 2, 2012, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which regulated all financial
services in the United Kingdom (UK), embarked on an ambitious restructuring plan
specifically designed to ultimately replace itself with two successor regulatory agencies the
following year. Not even a full week into the reorganization on April 6, the FSA was
confronted by news reports that a London-based trader for JPMorgan Chase & Company
(JPM) had taken sizeable derivatives positions that potentially exposed the bank to large
losses, since the trader single-handedly distorted the market for insurance against default
by corporate borrowers. In the end, this incident cost the bank over $6 billion in marketrelated losses and an additional $1 billion in government-imposed penalties.
The FSA had taken over the supervision of banks in the UK from the Bank of England in 1998,
and the Authority evolved over the next decade to become the sole regulator of all financial
services in the UK, in contrast to the patchwork of regulatory agencies in the United States.
However, because this single regulator model was deemed inadequate in light of the financial
crisis of 2007-09, the UK government overhauled its financial regulatory framework,
replacing the FSA with the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct
Authority in 2013.
As a global financial service provider, JPM is subject to supervision by banking regulatory
agencies in different countries. JPM’s commercial bank subsidiaries hold a US national
charter and thus are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Bruno
Iksil, the derivatives trader referenced in the April 6 media reports, was based in the London
office of JPM’s Chief Investment Office (CIO). The OCC was the primary US-based regulator
of CIO’s activities both in the US and in the UK, including those of Iksil, since CIO’s main
responsibility was to invest excess deposits generated by JPM’s commercial bank units. The
FSA also regulated JPM’s London operations, including those of the CIO.
Of course, JPM is not the only large US bank to have significant operations in the UK, just as
some large British banks also have material operations in the US. As a result, banking
regulators in the US and the UK have entered into Memoranda of Understanding with one
another to define basic parameters for sharing information gathered during bank
examinations and even assisting one another with bank inspections under certain
circumstances. Despite the fact that the OCC and the FSA were parties to such a
memorandum, the actual amount of cooperation in supervising JPM’s London office appears
to have been minimal. The US Senate subcommittee that investigated the 2012 trading loss
matter made no mention in its 300-page report that the OCC ever requested assistance from
its UK counterpart in examining CIO’s London office.
Though all domestic and foreign banks operating in the UK are required by the FSA
Principles for Businesses to deal with regulators in an open and cooperative way, the CIO
withheld critical data from the FSA in 2012 about the dramatic increase in the size of Iksil’s
credit derivative positions and the continued losses suffered by his portfolio.
The remainder of the case is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the CIO and its London
operations, as well as the agreement by US and UK banking regulators to share information.
Section 3 surveys the evolution of the financial regulatory regime in the UK since 1997.
Section 4 details FSA’s complaints of being misled by JPM as the London Whale saga was
unfolding in 2012. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the penalties levied by the UK
banking regulator against JPM, as well as the role of supervisory colleges. (See Appendix 1
for a timeline of key events pertinent to this case module.)
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Questions
1. What resources did the OCC have available (both on its own and in partnership
with UK regulators) to examine CIO’s London operations? Did the OCC make
sufficient use of these resources?
2. Could the timing of the FSA reorganization in April 2012 have contributed to
weaker oversight of JPM at that time?
3. How did JPM attempt to stifle FSA/FCA supervision?
4. What role, if any, could supervisory colleges have played in preventing/detecting
the London Whale incident?
5. What are the impediments to cross-border regulatory cooperation, and can these
impediments be removed?

2. The Extent of US/UK Cross-Border Regulatory Cooperation
In 2005, JPM separated its CIO from its Treasury unit, with CIO becoming a separate unit
within the bank. As JPM grew into the largest US bank holding company after the financial
crisis of 2007-09, the CIO likewise grew in importance, managing approximately $350 billion
of low-risk fixed income securities by December 31, 2011. These securities were funded
using excess deposits generated by JPM’s commercial banking subsidiaries (i.e., deposits that
had not otherwise been loaned to the bank’s customers). By year-end 2011, the CIO had 428
employees based in New York and London, consisting of 140 front-office traders and 288
middle- and back-office staff (JPM Task Force 2013, 21).
Achilles Macris, who was the head of CIO’s London office, had received approval in 2006 to
begin trading credit derivatives, such as credit default swaps, as a way to hedge some of the
credit risk emanating from JPM’s commercial banking units. This effort to partially offset the
bank’s default risk eventually became known as the Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP), and this
trading strategy led to total net revenue of almost $1.8 billion from 2008 through 2011 (US
Senate Report, 56).
Three London-based CIO employees were responsible for the SCP on a daily basis. Javier
Martin-Artajo, the head of credit and equity trading, reported to Macris and directly oversaw
the SCP. Bruno Iksil, who would come to be known as the “London Whale,” reported to
Martin-Artajo and was the senior trader for the SCP. Julien Grout was a junior trader and
reported to Iksil (US Senate Report, 24-25).
Because CIO’s main activities were closely related to JPM’s banking subsidiaries, CIO’s
primary US regulator was the OCC. The OCC was established in the 1860s to charter, regulate,
and supervise all national banks. By 2011, the OCC supervised about 2,000 banks using a
staff of 3,700 employees stationed in over 60 field offices across the country grouped under
four district offices (OCC Annual Report 2011, inside cover).
JPM is not the only large US bank to have significant operations in the UK. In fact, the OCC
maintains an office in London to better supervise the international activities of the national
banks under its jurisdiction. Likewise, various UK banks also have material operations in the
US. The Bank of England entered into a joint Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
primary US banking regulators in 1996 “[i]n view of the fact that a number of banking
organizations incorporated in the United States and the United Kingdom have material
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operations in each of the respective jurisdictions” (BOE MOU, 4). The OCC, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve Board were party to this MOU.
In addition to calling for signatories to meet at least annually to discuss general supervisory
developments and specific concerns about cross-border banks, the MOU calls for the sharing
of information. The US and UK regulators agreed to share “material supervisory concerns”
(if specific banks broke the law or otherwise operated in an unsafe or unsound manner), the
status of remedial actions imposed on banks, and information contained in examination and
inspection reports of cross-border branches and subsidiaries.
Though each country’s regulators would retain primary responsibility for examining all
domestic and foreign branches and subsidiaries of banks headquartered in that country (i.e.,
a US regulator would examine US and UK branches of a US bank), the home country regulator
could ask the host regulator to conduct an examination on its behalf “on an exceptional basis”
(BOE MOU, 4-7).
The US Senate subcommittee that investigated the 2012 CIO losses made no mention in its
300-page report that the OCC requested assistance from its UK counterpart in examining
CIO’s London office. However, this perhaps would have been a worthwhile undertaking.
Whereas the OCC had examiners with derivatives expertise stationed in its London office,
the agency “did not task any of its London staff to conduct examinations of the CIO’s London
operations,” even though the SCP was pursuing complicated strategies involving credit
derivatives (US Senate Report, 219).
(When the Bank of England’s duty to supervise UK banks was transferred to the Financial
Services Authority in 1998, the MOU was carried forward to reflect this fact. Likewise, the
MOU remained in effect after the Financial Services Authority was replaced by the Prudential
Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority in 2013. See Section 3 for a further
discussion of the evolution of the financial regulatory regime in the UK.)

3. Overview of the UK Financial Regulatory Regime
At the same time that London-based JPM employee Bruno Iksil was ramping up the size and
complexity of his credit derivative trading strategy at the start of 2012, the financial
regulatory regime in the UK was undergoing its most profound changes in more than a
decade.
In 1997, the Chancellor of the Exchequer began the process of merging banking supervision
and investment services regulation into the existing Securities and Investment Board, which
then changed its name to the Financial Services Authority (FSA). In stark contrast to the
longstanding patchwork of banking and financial regulatory agencies in the US, the scope of
the FSA’s authority grew over the following decade, until it became the sole financial services
regulator in the UK (FSA History).
1. Banking supervision (1998, from the Bank of England)
2. UK stock listings (2000, from the London Stock Exchange)
3. Securities and futures markets (2001)
4. Investment management (2001)
5. Mortgage finance (2004)
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6. Insurance (2005)
Due to the perception that this single-regulator model had proven inadequate during the
financial crisis of 2007-09, and shortly after the change of government in the UK in May 2010,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in June 2010 that the UK government would
overhaul its financial regulatory framework, including replacing the FSA with two new
successor agencies, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) (FSA Regulatory Reform). (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1: Primary Responsibilities of the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)

Source: FSA Regulatory Reform.
Banks, insurers, and major investment firms (referred to as “PRA-authorised”) are dual
regulated; that is, they are supervised by the PRA for prudential matters and by the FCA for
conduct issues. All other financial firms are supervised by the FCA for both prudential and
conduct matters (FSA Regulatory Reform). (See Figure 2.)
In preparation for the change, FSA reorganized itself internally into a so-called “twin peaks”
operating model, separating prudential and conduct regulation on April 2, 2012, a year
before the official legal creation of the PRA and FCA on April 1, 2013. (FSA Regulatory
Reform) Importantly, the start of the FSA transition on April 2, 2012, came at the beginning
of the very same week in which the huge size and complexity of Iksil’s credit-derivative bets
were exposed in articles published by Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal on April 6.
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Figure 2: Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority

Source: FSA Regulatory Reform.

4. Misleading the FSA/FCA
One of the reasons given by the FCA in its 2013 final notice penalizing JPM was the bank’s
failure to be open and cooperative with the regulator. (The final notice covered events that
took place in 2012, when the FSA was still the UK banking regulator, but the notice was
issued in September 2013, by which time the FSA had been replaced by the FCA as discussed
in Section 3.) FSA’s claim that JPM was not forthcoming about CIO’s trading activities was
based on a written request made by the FSA in November 2010 that it be informed of:
(a) any significant growth in assets or change in CIO’s Europe, Middle East and Asia
portfolios, including the SCP; (b) any significant change in CIO’s level of risk appetite;
(c) any material change to portfolio mandates or risk limits allocated to CIO’s Europe,
Middle East and Asia portfolios, which included the SCP; and (d) material changes to
CIO’s Europe, Middle East and Asia strategy. (FCA Final Notice, 42)
The FSA would hold quarterly supervisory meetings with JPM. The first-quarter 2012
meeting took place on March 28 and was attended by London-based CIO and SCP
management. The SCP was discussed during the meeting, but JPM personnel did not inform
the FSA of certain important facts.
Though JPM provided analysis to the FSA showing that the SCP had lost $170 million through
February and was expected to lose an additional $51 million in March, the trading strategy
had in fact already lost a total of $298 million by March 27. (SCP would go on to lose $319
million just on March 31, for a total of $719 million for the quarter.) JPM sought to placate
the FSA about the size of the losses with analysis showing that SCP’s Value at Risk (VaR) had
apparently decreased from an average of $92 million during January to only $48 million by
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March 16. However, the bank neglected to mention that the primary reason for the drop was
because CIO changed the risk model that is used to calculate VaR at the end of January.
Likewise, JPM did not inform FSA that the size of the credit derivative positions in the SCP
had more than doubled from $51 billion of net notional value at December 31, 2011, to $131
billion by March 26. (SCP would grow to $151 billion of net notional value by March 31.) In
addition, JPM did not notify the FSA that the breach of a key risk limit less than a week before
the March 28 meeting between the bank and the regulator had finally caused the CIO to halt
active trading of the SCP on March 23 (FCA Final Notice, 42-43).
The following week began with the internal reorganization of the FSA into separate
prudential and conduct business units on Monday, April 2, and ended with the first news
stories about the London Whale trades on Friday, April 6. Like its counterparts in the US, the
FSA was caught off guard by the media reports and immediately requested more information
from the bank about Iksil and his trading activities. In a conference call on April 10, CIO
London management assured the FSA that the SCP had not materially changed since the
March 28 meeting and that the news stories were about credit derivatives that were “broadly
a hedge of the firm’s exposures outside CIO.” However, CIO management failed to inform the
FSA that cumulative losses from the portfolio in question were more than $700 million
during the first quarter and were expected to and in fact did exceed $1 billion by the end of
the April 10 trading day (FCA Final Notice, 43-44).
The JPMorgan Chase Management Task Force (JPM Task Force) launched its internal
investigation of the CIO losses in May 2012, and senior bank management met with the FSA
on June 20 to discuss the initial findings of the investigation. Though the JPM Task Force was
aware by this date that the SCP traders may have incorrectly reported the fair value of the
credit derivatives they traded in an effort to hide their increasing losses and that the bank’s
legal advisors had started interviewing the SCP traders as a result, this information was not
shared with the FSA. JPM senior management only informed the FSA on July 2 that the bank
had uncovered evidence causing it to doubt the accuracy of the SCP fair value reporting
process. Not long thereafter, JPM announced publicly on July 13 that it was restating firstquarter earnings, reducing consolidated total net revenue by $660 million from $26.712
billion to $26.052 billion, which in turn reduced after-tax net income by $459 million from
$5.383 billion to $4.924 billion (FCA Final Notice, 45).

5. Aftermath
On September 19, 2013, the FCA joined with banking regulators in the US to announce a
global settlement with JPM pertaining to the 2012 London Whale trades. The FCA, the
Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
penalized JPM a total of $920 million. One month later, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) also settled with the bank for a penalty of $100 million.
While the various regulatory agencies focused on different elements of the CIO losses in their
respective settlement agreements with the bank, the FCA levied a penalty of £137,610,000
(about $220 million) because JPM’s “conduct demonstrated flaws permeating all levels of the
firm: from portfolio level right up to senior management, resulting in breaches of Principles
2, 3, 5, and 11 of the FCA’s Principles for Businesses” (FCA Press Release).
In its September 19 press release, the FCA commented that the joint settlement agreement
resulted from a “significant cross-border investigation” and thanked the following US parties
“for their cooperation”: the SEC, the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New
York, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the OCC, the New York Federal Reserve Bank, and
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the CFTC (FCA Press Release). However, the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, and the SEC did
not mention the existence of any cross-border investigation in their respective press releases
of September 19 announcing the settlement.
Though MOU, such as the one between the US and the UK, have existed on a bilateral and
multilateral basis for many years, some of these cooperative arrangements were later
formalized as “supervisory colleges” in the 2000s. In response, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (BCBS) published Good Practice Principles on Supervisory Colleges in
2010 pertaining to these “permanent but flexible structures for collaboration, coordination,
and information-sharing among the authorities responsible for and involved in the
supervision of cross-border banking groups” (BCBS 2014, 1).
Figure 3: Financial Conduct Authority Principles for Businesses

Source: FCA Press Release.
In June 2014, the BCBS revised these recommendations, now entitled Principles for Effective
Supervisory Colleges, to reflect changes in supervisory best practice that arose from the
recent financial crisis. See Appendix 2 for a summary of the seven principles.
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Appendix 1: Timeline of Key Events
1997
1998
2000
2001
2004
2005
2006

2010

June

2011

December 31

2012

March 23
March 28
April 2
April 6

April 10

July 13
December 31
2013

April 1
SeptemberOctober

Financial Services Authority (FSA) formed in the United
Kingdom (UK) as a successor to the Securities and Investment
Board.
FSA took over banking supervision.
FSA took over approval of UK stock listings.
FSA took over regulation of investment management firms, as
well as securities and futures markets.
FSA took over mortgage regulation.
FSA took over insurance regulation. JPMorgan Chase &
Company (JPM) spun off its Chief Investment Office (CIO) as a
separate unit to invest the bank’s excess deposits.
CIO approved a proposal by Achilles Macris to trade credit
derivatives.
The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the
government of the UK would overhaul the financial regulatory
framework, including abolishing the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) and splitting its functions into two new
successor agencies.
CIO had 428 employees and managed a $350 billion portfolio
of low-risk fixed income securities.
Ina Drew (JPM Chief Investment Officer and head of CIO)
ordered the CIO traders to stop trading the Synthetic Credit
Portfolio (SCP).
FSA held a quarterly supervisory meeting with JPM.
FSA reorganized itself internally into a so-called “twin peaks”
operating model, separating prudential and conduct
regulation.
Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal published the first
news stories about the “London Whale.”
FSA met with CIO London management for the first time since
the media stories. CIO management did not inform the FSA
that cumulative losses from the SCP book were more than
$700 million during the first quarter and were expected to,
and in fact did, exceed $1 billion by the end of the trading day.
JPM restated Q1 earnings, reporting additional pre-tax losses
of $660 million due to the SCP ($459 million after tax).
Year-to-date SCP losses = $6.2 billion.
FSA replaced by the Prudential Regulation Authority and the
Financial Conduct Authority.
Four regulators in the US and one in the UK reached
settlement agreements with JPM, totaling $1.020 billion in
penalties.
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Appendix 2: Principles for Effective Supervisory Colleges
Principle 1: College objectives
“Supervisory colleges should enhance, on an ongoing and confidential basis, information
exchange and cooperation among supervisors to support the effective supervision of
international banking groups. Colleges should enhance the mutual trust and appreciation
of needs and responsibilities on which supervisory relationships are built.”
Principle 2: College structures
“Supervisory colleges should be structured in a way that enhances effective oversight of
international banking groups, taking into account the scale, structure and complexity of
the banking group, its significance in host jurisdictions and the corresponding needs of
its supervisors. While a college is a single forum, multiple or variable substructures may
be used given that no single college structure is likely to be suitable for all banks.”
Principle 3: Information-sharing
“College members should do their best to promptly share appropriate information with
respect to a banking group’s principal risks, vulnerabilities and risk management
practices. Mutual trust and willingness to cooperate are key for effective two-way
information-sharing. To facilitate this process, supervisory colleges should strive
towards confidentiality agreements among college members, such as those contained in
memoranda of understanding.”
Principle 4: Communication channels
“Communication channels within a college should ensure the efficiency, ease of use,
integrity and confidentiality of information exchange. The home supervisor should make
sound communication channels available to the college and host supervisors should use
them appropriately and regularly.”
Principle 5: Collaborative work
“Supervisory colleges should promote collaborative work among members, as
appropriate, to improve the effectiveness of the oversight of international banking
groups. Collaborative work should be by agreement among supervisors and should
recognize national legal constraints.”
Principle 6: Interaction with the institution
“Interaction between the college members and the banking group should complement
the interaction that individual supervisors (both home and host) have with the specific
entity they supervise.”
Principle 7: Crisis preparedness
“Supervisory colleges are distinct from but complementary to crisis management and
resolution structures. The work of a banking group’s supervisory college should
contribute to effective crisis management planning.”
Source: BCBS 2014, 4-18.
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